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Canada’s experiences with transferring the command of its military forces to another 
nation originate with the South African War, 
when the Canadian contingent was assigned 
to, and integrated with, British forces. While 
command of the Canadian forces during the war 
was characterized by near total subordination 
to the British field commanders, the decision 
to send an official contingent for Canada’s first 
major overseas deployment and the formation 
and organization of this military expeditionary 
force were greatly influenced by the actions of 
three staunch British imperialists in London 
and in Ottawa. 
 Joseph Chamberlain had been the secretary 
of state for the colonies for over four years, 
and sought greater colonial participation in 
the defence of the Empire. The Boer (or South 
African) War gave him the opportunity. The Fourth 
Earl of Minto had been named governor-general 
of Canada in the summer of 1898, and a few 
months later Major-General Edward T.H. Hutton 
had arrived in Ottawa as the general officer 
commanding (GOC) the Canadian militia. Both 
resolutely believed in Chamberlain’s imperial 
vision. As war in South Africa grew nearer in 
the fall of 1899 the three agents of the British 
government had, for different reasons, a strong 
interest in the formation of a uniquely Canadian 
contingent and in the selection and rank of its 
first national commander. 
 The circumstances that surrounded 
the decision to offer and deploy a Canadian 
contingent to South Africa in October 1899 
have received considerable study.1 These studies 
have tended to focus on the political intrigues 
among Chamberlain, Minto and Hutton, on their 
“clandestine attempt” to force Prime Minister 
Wilfrid Laurier’s hand for Canadian military 
participation,2 and on the reactions of Canadian 
politicians to imperial demands for participation 
in the war in response to divided opinion in 
Canada. Unfortunately, because of the enduring 
allegations of an imperial conspiracy to pressure 
the Canadian government to participate in the 
war, and later charges that the British imperialists 
encouraged the break up of the contingent,3 the 
contribution they made in bringing about the 
formation of a distinct Canadian contingent 
commanded by a Canadian militia officer has 
been largely marginalized in past historical 
studies.
 This article explores the role played by 
Chamberlain, Minto and Hutton in shaping the 
organizational and command structure of the 
Canadian expeditionary force that deployed to 
South Africa. In 1899, the war raised not only 
the vital question about the kind of imperial war 
Canada ought to participate in, but also the form 
of that participation. As this article demonstrates, 
the British politician, the colonial administrator 
and the general saw the war as an opportunity 
to advance their specific agenda, strongly fuelled 
by imperialist sentiments. In doing so, the ideas 
that shaped their actions between July and 
October 1899 provided the base for a succession 
of seemingly unrelated decisions that had a 
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6substantial influence on Canada’s contribution 
and on the command arrangements in South 
Africa. The Canadian soldiers who sailed to 
South Africa were, for the first time, grouped 
in a national military formation commanded by 
a Canadian officer, setting a precedent for the 
country’s participation in future conflicts.
The Boer War, Joseph Chamberlain 
and Wilfrid Laurier
The Boer War had its origins in more than two centuries of hostility and conflict between 
the British and the descendants of the region’s 
first Dutch settlers, known as the Boers. The 
war took place between 1899 and 1902, and 
saw British and colonial forces pitted against the 
Afrikaner Republic of South Africa (also known 
as Transvaal) and the Orange Free State, the two 
most northerly independent republics where the 
Boers had settled. The Boers declared war on 11 
October 1899, and the British public expected 
peace by Christmas.4 At the time, Queen Victoria 
ruled over a large empire, Britain was at the 
height of its power, and the British people were 
proud of their military capabilities and confident 
of their place at the centre of the world. Instead, 
the war proved to be the longest, costliest, 
bloodiest, and the most humiliating conflict for 
Britain between 1815 and 1914, requiring the 
committment of nearly 450,000 imperial and 
colonial soldiers.5 Canada sent more than 7,300 
soldiers to South Africa, and approximately 270 
perished there.6  
 In the decades following Confederation, 
Canadian defence policy was insular, with the 
militia focused on the defence of Canada from 
a possible invasion by the United States. In 
practice, the main role of the army was internal 
security, settling minor riots and suppressing 
At the 1897 Colonial Conference in London, Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secretery (seated) attempted to convince 
the colonial premiers (among them Canada’s prime minister, Wilfrid Laurier, standing front row, second from left) to expand 
their military establishments. He failed to get a formal arrangement, but planted the seeds for the colonial contribution 
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7rebellions, such as the campaign that took 
place to put down the North-West Rebellion of 
1885.7 The defence establishment was highly 
politicized, and patronage and favouritism were 
rampant.8 While the Militia Act of 1868 provided 
for a large volunteer militia, the permanent 
military establishment was small, limited to less 
than 1,000 personnel enlisted for continuous 
service and employed almost exclusively in an 
instructional role. In 1899, the Permanent Force 
officer corps consisted of four British and 63 
Canadian officers.9
 Deteriorating world events in the mid-1890s 
led the new British secretary of state for the 
colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, to champion 
improved defences of the empire. With his 
appointment in 1895, Chamberlain had “brought 
new vigor to the Colonial Office.”10 While the 
position of colonial secretary was not customarily 
an influential cabinet appointment in the British 
government, with tension rising in the world, the 
state of the empire became a key concern of the 
government, giving more importance to colonial 
matters, especially defence and trade. 
 At the Colonial Conference of 1897, 
Chamberlain exerted considerable pressure 
on the colonies to augment their land and 
naval forces.11 He failed to gain formal military 
commitments, but managed to receive acceptance 
of the principle of uniformity in organization, 
training and equipment, and agreement for an 
occasional interchange of military units.12 As 
he told the colonial representatives present, 
including Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier, he 
saw the possibility of regiments of the colonies 
fulfilling an expeditionary role with other military 
forces of the empire, to “share in the dangers 
and the glories of the British army and take their 
part in expeditions in which the British army 
may be engaged….”13 Two years later, the Boer 
War would provide the colonial secretary with 
the opportunity to put his imperial vision to the 
test.
 In the late 1890s Canada was the largest 
and most prosperous self-governing colony of 
the empire, and the colonial secretary firmly 
believed that Canada ought to demonstrate 
leadership and increase its imperial defence 
contribution.14 Despite Canada’s strong ties to 
the empire and the demands of the Anglophone 
community that Canada fulfil her obligations to 
the mother country, the decision to participate in 
this foreign war was a difficult one for Laurier and 
his government. However, Chamberlain saw the 
South African crisis as the occasion for a marked 
demonstration to the world of imperial military 
unity. He wanted colonial participation in South 
Africa “to demonstrate to…European enemies 
that, in the event of a major crisis, the self-
governing colonies would not stand aside.”15 
 Despite Chamberlain’s ardent desire for 
colonial military participation, the Boer threat 
was not a menace to the security of the empire 
and many Canadian politicians – especially 
Laurier – seriously questioned the wisdom of 
participating in this imperial small war.16 The 
prime minister knew that a debate over Canada’s 
participation in this war would highlight the rift 
between French and English Canadians over the 
Dominion’s involvement in overseas conflicts of 
the empire.17 Strong French-Canadian opposition 
to the war, and concerns that the despatch 
of Canadian soldiers would set a precedent 
for future imperial adventures, created deep 
divisions inside the cabinet and contributed to 
Laurier’s indecision. 
 There was a possible compromise. If 
Britain recruited volunteers to integrate in the 
British Army, as had been done before, the 
Canadian government would avoid taking a 
difficult decision that might split the country 
between the imperial enthusiasts and those who 
wanted no part in Britain’s wars. Even if the 
government did not raise an official contingent, 
Canadians volunteers, feeling a surge of imperial 
sentiment, would likely participate in the war.18 
Offers of service by private individuals to raise 
units started to surface in the fall 1899 as the 
possibility of conflict grew.19 
 The prime minister’s more immediate 
concern in 1899 was the economic growth and 
prosperity of the new Dominion, and he was 
convinced that the colonies should not “assume 
the burden of military expenditures, except…in 
the case of pressing danger.”20 His objections 
to raising and sending a Canadian contingent 
were centred more on the open-ended nature 
of military financial commitments than on the 
principle of participation in a foreign imperial 
war, but he realized that Canadian participation 
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8in the war would promote a closer relationship 
within the empire and might sway Britain to 
compromise on the issue of the preferential tariff 
for Canadian goods exported within the empire.21 
If Britain were willing to recruit Canadians and 
pay for their participation in the war, Laurier 
would not object. Major-General Hutton, however, 
had other ideas, consistent with his desire for 
a more robust Canadian army and for greater 
Canadian participation in imperial military 
affairs.
Major-General Hutton and Dreams
of a Canadian National Army
A combination of good fortune and forethought by Chamberlain saw the arrival in 1898 of 
a new governor-general, Lord Minto, and a new 
general officer to command the Canadian militia, 
Major-General Hutton, two “outstanding and 
vigorous” imperialists.22 Chamberlain believed 
that Minto, a former soldier, would be of great 
help in convincing the Canadian government of 
the necessity of improving the military. Hutton, 
who Chamberlain had interviewed for nearly two 
hours prior to his departure for Canada, knew 
he had the support of both the colonial secretary 
and the governor-general as he embarked upon 
a series of reforms soon after taking command 
of the militia.23
 Hutton “was aggressive, imaginative, and 
energetic, with nearly limitless self-confidence,” 
and he approached his new responsibilities with 
an uncommon fervour. Shortly after his arrival in 
Canada, he visited many militia districts, made 
an inspection tour of the units, and delivered 
public speeches at every occasion to educate and 
win over the Canadian public and to persuade 
influential newspapers of the need for a Canadian 
national army. By the summer of 1899, when the 
possibility of war in South Africa appeared more 
serious, Hutton knew better than the Canadian 
government what the militia could do and the 
positive reaction to his speeches made him 
optimistic about what the public would accept 
for its military.24 
 In his 1898 end-of-year report to Parliament, 
Hutton characterized the existing condition of the 
military forces of the Dominion as “unsatisfactory 
in the extreme,” and had found a receptive ear 
for reforms in Dr. Frederick W. Borden, the 
minister of militia and defence.25 The Canadian 
militia, which consisted of numerous small 
units of cavalry, artillery, and infantry of varying 
strength, was of dubious quality in discipline 
Joseph Chamberlain, secretary of state for the colonies,1895-1903 (left); Sir Gilbert John Murray Kynynmound Elliot, 
4th Earl of Minto, governor-general of Canada, 1898-1904 (centre); Major-General Edward T.H. Hutton, general ofﬁcer 
commanding the Canadian militia, 1898-1900 (right). Though not Canadian, these three men played a major role in 
Canada’s decision to send troops to support Britain during the South African War, a precedent which would shape all 
future Canadian overseas military deployments.
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9and efficiency.26 Hutton dreamed of creating 
a “national army” that could rapidly mobilize 
and make Canadians proud, one with a trained 
general staff and departmental corps, such as an 
army service corps and a medical corps.27 
 Wanting to create a capable, field-ready 
army for the Dominion, he saw little value in 
pursuing proposals to integrate the tiny Canadian 
permanent force into the British regular army, a 
suggestion Chamberlain had made at the Colonial 
Conference of 1897.28 Instead, his desire was 
for Canada to be able to contribute to imperial 
wars, and he believed that the Canadian army, in 
addition to the defence of Canadian soil, should 
have the “power to participate in the defence of 
the British Empire….”29 In early 1899, however, 
despite Hutton’s dreams, any suggestion of 
fielding an autonomous army formation, such as 
a brigade, was out of the question. The Canadian 
militia lacked all the essential components 
necessary for an army to conduct independent 
overseas operations. It also had no trained staff, 
and its units did not exercise together. In addition 
to these systemic organizational deficiencies, 
Canadian army officers and soldiers had no 
experience in expeditionary wars. In short, as 
Hutton concluded in his annual report, the militia 
force of Canada of 1899 was not “under the 
existing system, an army, in its true sense….”30 
The conflict in South Africa provided Hutton with 
an ideal opportunity to advance his own interests 
in reforming the Canadian militia.31
The Formation of a Distinct Canadian 
National Contingent 
In July 1899, when relations between the British and the Boers in the Transvaal became 
more strained, and the likelihood of a conflict 
increased, Chamberlain had written Minto 
about a possible Canadian military force serving 
with British troops in South Africa.32 At Minto’s 
request, Hutton immediately developed a plan 
to form a Canadian brigade of 1,209 personnel 
and 314 horses, comprised of infantry, mounted 
infantry, and artillery.33 To give his proposal the 
best odds at being accepted by the War Office, 
Hutton ensured that the organization of his 
proposed Canadian brigade was consistent with 
the latest British war establishment. 
 The experienced British officer also wanted 
a contingent that would be capable of operating 
independently in the field within a British 
army division, and he reasoned that a small 
headquarters staff was required to support the 
contingent commander. Even though the proposed 
force did not exist in the tiny Permanent Force 
in Canada, Hutton firmly believed that he could 
raise it from the militia and deploy it to South 
Africa in 14 days, provided the militia department 
could contract a ship in time. Within days of 
learning of Hutton’s proposal, Minto had relayed 
it with his full support to Chamberlain.34 
 Hutton informed Borden in early September 
of his proposal, including the names of officers 
recommended for employment. Borden seemed 
confident that, in the event of hostilities, Canada 
would offer a contingent.35 Canadian military 
autonomy was one of the principles of action 
that highlighted Borden’s 15-year tenure as 
minister, as he firmly believed that “autonomy 
and imperialism were complementary, not 
contradictory.”36 During the October cabinet 
crisis surrounding the decision to participate in 
the war, Borden led the faction pressing for a full 
contingent (with infantry, artillery and mounted 
troops), equipped, transported and paid by the 
Canadian government.37 
 With diplomatic events unfolding rapidly in 
September, the discussions between London and 
Ottawa intensified, especially after Chamberlain’s 
circular cable of 3 October 1899, which outlined 
strict terms for colonial military participation: 
Firstly, units should consist of about 125 men; 
secondly, may be infantry, mounted infantry or 
cavalry; in view of numbers already available 
infantry most, Cavalry least, serviceable…fifthly, 
not more than one Captain and three Subalterns 
each unit. Where more than one unit from single 
Colony, force may be commanded by officer 
not higher than major. In considering numbers 
which can be employed Secretary of State for 
War guided by nature of offers, by desire that 
each Colony should be fairly represented, and 
limits necessary if force is to be fully utilized 
by available staff as integral portion of Imperial 
forces; would gladly accept four units….38
This cable is important as it reveals much about 
the priorities of the War Office for a potential 
colonial contribution, and set out key conditions 
affecting the organization and the command 
LAC C-006359
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structure of a possible Canadian contingent. The 
War Office was certainly aware of Hutton’s small 
brigade proposal, and that many Canadians were 
anxious to volunteer, but preferred small infantry 
units that could be easily integrated into army 
battalions commanded by British officers, unlike 
cavalry units that required more training, tended 
to operate more independently, and were more 
difficult to control.39 
 Lord Lansdowne, the secretary of state for 
war, confirmed after the war during his testimony 
to the Royal Commission on the War in South 
Africa that “[t]he reason infantry were asked for 
was that it was proposed that we should attach 
small bodies of Colonial soldiers to the units of 
Imperial soldiers already at the Cape.”40 Since the 
total colonial contribution sought was very small 
in relation to the British army force, the British 
field commanders wanted the greatest flexibility 
for their employment of the colonial troops.41 To 
begin with, the military authorities believed that 
they had a large enough force in South Africa 
for their purpose. Moreover, British officers 
were aware that most colonial soldiers were 
volunteers, not part of formed and trained units, 
and thought they would be difficult to manage 
and more a burden than anything else.42 
 The War Office had a prejudice against 
irregular troops, a distrust of the colonial 
fighting ability, and it was convinced that the 
inexperience of the colonials would jeopardize 
the regulars.43 General Redvers Buller, the 
designated commander-in-chief in South 
Africa, had advised the War Office against the 
participation of independent colonial units. A 
larger colonial force, such as the small brigade 
of arms contemplated by Hutton, was a more 
complex war organization and one that would 
present more integration challenges to the British 
commanders in the field. It would also deploy 
with a larger complement of senior colonial 
officers, a proposition not attractive to the 
British field commanders. In the end, it was only 
under strong pressure from the War Office that 
Buller consented to accept small detachments, 
a compromise that led to the wording of the 3 
October cable.44
 The telegram from the Colonial Office was 
a request for an official Canadian contingent, 
and the government definitely understood it as 
such.45 The terms and conditions imposed by 
the War Office dissatisfied Borden, but did not 
deter military men like Hutton and Minto, who 
clearly saw this first cable as the opening round 
of negotiations for the Canadian contribution.46 
For one, Minto remained very concerned that 
the conditions outlined in the telegram for 
colonial contributions kept the door open for 
the possibility that Canadian participation might 
end up being privately-raised regiments.47 The 
governor-general believed that the issue was 
important enough to write to the prime minister 
to comment on the cable from the Colonial 
Office: 
I am strongly of the option that it would be much 
better that they [troops] should be offered by the 
Govt: – the organization being undertaken by the 
Govt: – selection of officers etc. Up to the present 
this has not been thought advisable … but it may 
be time to reconsider the question – rather than 
to allow an irresponsible call for volunteers. I can 
not think it advisable that Col. Hughes should 
be allowed to raise an expedition of his own 
responsibility – representing Canada….48 
 It was clear to Minto that the government 
must be seen as the driving force behind the 
Canadian contribution, and not individuals such 
as Conservative M.P. Lieutenant-Colonel Sam 
Hughes. Acceptance of individual volunteer offers 
by the War Office would have enabled the Laurier 
government to avoid making an official offer, an 
alternative Minto dreaded. By then, there were 
many private offers for service in South Africa 
putting even more pressure on the Canadian 
government to act.49
 Minto also advised Laurier on the composition 
and the command of the contingent, even though 
the prime minister had yet to express any interest 
in offering a government-organized force:
You will see from the [3 October] Cable that it is 
evidently intended that the Canadian troops on 
arriving in S. Africa should be attached to the 
different units which they represent & that they 
should not remain constituted as a Canadian 
contingent. I think it would be better if troops 
are to be offered at all that they should be offered 
as a Canadian contingent to act as such - & 
possibly this offer might still be made, & would 
appear more dignified, & also could find a much 
better officer to command it than if we accept the 
suggestion of small units – and an officer of the 
rank of Major to command which would cut out 
some of the best Canadian officers.50 
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 On 9 October, the Boer ultimatum to Britain 
expired, and war was declared. Two days later, 
Boer troops moved into British territory. On 13 
October, Minto, at the conclusion of a lengthy 
cabinet meeting,  telegraphed Chamberlain 
advising him that the Canadian government had 
agreed to offer 1,000 infantry based on the terms 
proposed in the Colonial Office telegram. Now 
that the government had agreed to despatch a 
respectable Canadian contribution, Minto and 
Hutton devoted all their efforts to influence the 
organization and command of the contingent. 
 Minto stressed to Chamberlain that the troops 
offered should be kept together as a Canadian 
national contingent, realizing nevertheless that 
this aspect “must be left to discretion of War 
Office and [the] Commander-in-Chief.” He also 
reiterated the idea of a small brigade comprised 
of two small battalions and one artillery battery.51 
Hutton, for his part, knew that the governor-
general was in regular contact with the colonial 
secretary, and told Minto that he was “extremely 
sorry” that, according to the 3 October cable, the 
Canadian troops would not “go as a distinct unit.” 
Having visited many units and spoken to many 
district commanders and commanding officers, 
Hutton understood the harmful consequences of 
parcelling small Canadian infantry units into the 
British Army, and warned that “[t]he Canadian 
Militia esprit-de-Corps cannot fail to be injured 
and much unfavourable comment will arise.”52 
During his travel across the country, he had 
become acutely aware that Canadians wanted to 
serve together, under their own officers.53 
 On 16 October Hutton wrote to Colonel 
Hubert Foster, his chief of staff, in Ottawa:
Please inform Minister [Borden] as follows: 
I very deeply regret proposed Colonial Office 
organization and distribution of companies, by 
which identity [of] Canadian troops will be lost. 
I recommend that at any rate the eight companies 
be despatched from Canada as a regimental unit 
and upon arrival in South Africa that intimation 
be made to the Imperial Govt that it be placed 
at disposal of General Buller for service as 
required. I would urge that representation be 
Soldiers from the Canadian Mounted Riﬂes, part of the second contingent
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further made that the retention of Canadians in 
one single infantry unit would, if circumstances 
admit, be more consistent with the wishes of 
Canadians Troops.54
 Borden was of the same mind on this issue. 
While Borden publicly told the press that the 
militia department would continue “to organize 
the South Africa contingent on the basis of eight 
companies,” he privately confided to Minto that 
the units would be assembled into two battalions 
as soon as the men were on board the ship.55
 But it was not just the War Office that wanted 
small colonial infantry units. Quebec cabinet 
members were, in the opinion of the governor-
general, “trying to render the contingent as little 
representative as possible,” so as not to set a 
precedent for future Canadian participation.56 
The resulting 14 October order-in-council 
authorizing the force was therefore a compromise 
document, which intentionally lacked specific 
direction and did not make any reference to a 
Canadian contingent or brigade. It only confirmed 
that the government had agreed to equip and 
transport to South Africa up to 1,000 volunteers, 
without any mention about how these volunteers 
were to be organized or commanded.57 
 In spite of the cabinet’s decision, the governor-
general continued to promote to both Borden 
and Chamberlain the concept of a Canadian 
brigade. Minto’s persistence on this issue 
greatly irritated the prime minister, even though 
Laurier admitted that he did not understand the 
distinction between contributing a contingent 
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the brigade organization proposed by Hutton as 
only an improvement on the government’s intent, 
while those members of the cabinet opposing 
formal Canadian participation clearly perceived 
anything beyond a basic regiment of infantry as 
broadening of the scope of the contribution that 
had been agreed in cabinet after a prolonged and 
bitter debate.59 Although the word “contingent” 
had been intentionally omitted in the text of the 
order-in-council, specifically to appease Quebec 
politicians, Laurier had by then implicitly 
accepted the concept of a distinct Canadian 
contingent in South Africa, a very important 
achievement for Minto, Hutton and Canadian 
soldiers. 
 The debate on the matter of sending a 
contingent, a regiment of infantry or a small 
brigade is important, as it reveals the motivations 
of the politicians and the military officers who 
shaped the Canadian contribution to the South 
African War. Minto, Hutton and the militia 
department had the expertise to appreciate 
fully the military consequences of sending an 
independently capable army formation as opposed 
to eight small infantry companies that could be 
attached to different British units. Laurier, on 
the other hand, did not appreciate those nuances 
and was quite satisfied with Canada contributing 
a dignified representative force, as it preserved 
cabinet solidarity while not incurring extra 
expenditures for the young Dominion.60 Some 
members of the cabinet believed that fielding an 
independent brigade of artillery and mounted 
infantry as well as dismounted infantry would 
have given too much profile and visibility to the 
Canadian contribution, and created an important 
precedent. They reasoned that a Canadian 
contingent of dismounted infantry was a sufficient 
undertaking for the Dominion. As for other 
matters that affected military effectiveness, such 
as organization, equipment and command, it was 
up to Borden, Minto and Hutton to address with 
the War Office, and to the designated Canadian 
national commander (Lieutenant-Colonel William 
D. Otter) to sort out the details with the British 
army staff once in South Africa.
 It was the military authorities in South 
Africa and not the Colonial Office nor the War 
Office that needed to be convinced of the merit 
of keeping the Canadian soldiers together as a 
unit. Under British army doctrine of the time, the 
field commander in South Africa had complete 
autonomy to conduct the war as he saw fit. 
The War Office saw its wartime role as largely 
administrative, and its primary function and chief 
operational concern was the mobilization of the 
army at the beginning of a war.61 In 1899, control 
of the army field formations for the conduct of 
operations remained firmly in the hands of the 
commanders-in-chief dispersed around the 
globe. Decisions about the type of military units 
required, their role, field organization, and 
employment in the theatre of war were the sole 
responsibility of the commander-in-chief in South 
Africa, General Buller.62 
 The under secretary at the Colonial Office 
highlighted for Chamberlain the predicament 
facing the War Office with the Canadian offer: 
The War Office anticipate difficulties with the 
Military authorities [in South Africa] as to the 
Canadian offer which varies from the suggestions 
made to them, both as regards the number of 
units and the organization. On the latter question 
I do not think it would be possible or advisable 
to question the military view, but…. I think an 
effort should be made to meet their wishes if 
possible…. If we are to get the political result 
Wilfrid Laurier, the Canadian prime minister, was content 
with Canada’s contribution to the Boer War being a 
digniﬁed representative force. Minto and Hutton had more 
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anticipated from having Colonial detachments, 
we must endeavour to do what we can to avoid 
anything likely to cause embarrassment to the 
Govt. of the Colonies. Perhaps you [Chamberlain] 
should let Lord Wolseley [commander-in-chief in 
London] have a line as to your views.63 
 Chamberlain could certainly appreciate the 
political benefit of the Canadian offer, and he 
stressed to the secretary of state for war, Lord 
Lansdowne, that Canada had offered twice 
the number of troops requested. He warned 
Lansdowne that he would not accept a decision 
for fewer than the 1,000 soldiers offered, as it 
would “be a fatal policy – and it is policy and 
not military necessity which has governed our 
decision….To refuse their offer would grievously 
offend and discourage them….”64 Lansdowne 
sent the Canadian proposal to the commander-
in-chief in London for his review, and replied 
to Chamberlain that he “was inclined to allow 
the political considerations to outweigh the 
military...,” a statement indicative of the political 
importance of having the self-governing colonies 
participate in the war with Britain with official 
contingents.65 
 The War Office eventually accepted the 
Canadian offer of 1,000 soldiers,66 but could not 
guarantee that the contingent would always be 
kept together during operations, stressing that 
the commander-in-chief in South Africa must 
retain a “free hand to deal with the Brigade as 
he likes.”67 As Chamberlain reminded Minto, 
the senior British general in South Africa “must 
have the power to dispose of contingent to best 
advantage.”68 Even Minto, the former soldier, could 
not really take exception to this condition, aimed 
at achieving the greatest operational effectiveness 
in the field. The eight companies formed were 
subsequently organized into one large infantry 
battalion (instead of two, as originally envisaged), 
and became the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion, 
Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry (2 RCR). 
The Command of the
Canadian Contingent 
Both Minto and Hutton took a personal interest in the selection of the 41 officers 
for the regiment. Hutton knew many of the 
available militia officers, and wanted, above all, 
Hutton (third from right) believed that he was the best-qualiﬁed ofﬁcer to command the Canadian contingent in South 
Africa, but it was a Canadian, Lieutenant-Colonel William Otter (third from left), an experienced and respected regular 
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to prevent political influence and interference in 
the selection for appointments in the contingent. 
As well, Minto was interested in ensuring that the 
best Canadian officers filled the key positions. His 
correspondence with Laurier and Chamberlain 
gave particular attention to the choice of the 
commander for the Canadian contingent. 
 The Canadians, as events showed, were 
very well served by Minto. As one biographer of 
Laurier stated, Minto was “very much the soldier, 
very much Chamberlain’s man, but a great deal 
more sympathetic and alert to Canadian attitudes 
than he at first seemed.”69 He possessed a wide 
knowledge of Canadian military conditions 
gained in 1883-85 when he had been military 
secretary to the governor-general of Canada, 
then Lord Lansdowne, and he had seen military 
action in many countries, including Afghanistan, 
South Africa, and Egypt. As chief of staff to the 
general officer commanding the North-West field 
force during the Rebellion of 1885, he was able 
to appreciate that Canadian troops fought most 
effectively when grouped in a unit to which they 
felt a close association, and under their own 
commanders.70 A former commanding officer 
himself, Minto understood the importance of 
unit cohesion and esprit de corps. He thus 
had a heightened sensitivity to the importance 
of command in the field, and, to his credit, 
he recognized that officers employed with the 
contingent should be Canadians.71 Minto, as his 
several letters to Laurier and Chamberlain in 
the summer and fall 1899 demonstrate, devoted 
considerable efforts to influence the prime 
minister and the colonial secretary not only on 
the organization of the contingent, but also on its 
leadership. 
 Hutton also wanted as many Canadian 
officers as possible to command the troops, so 
that they could gain experience to help him with 
the re-organization of the militia.72 But, as to the 
overall commander of the force, Hutton was of 
two minds: if a Canadian had to command the 
force, then Lieutenant-Colonel Otter, a respected 
and experienced permanent force officer, was his 
recommendation to Borden; otherwise, Hutton 
believed that he was the best-qualified officer to 
command the Canadians and other colonials in 
South Africa.73 
 British officers in the militia department 
were well aware that British regular army officers 
regarded colonial officers very poorly. To justify 
his command of the Canadians, Hutton had even 
emphasized to Minto the unique challenges of 
commanding colonial troops,74 believing that 
only a qualified, trained and experienced officer 
could hope to gain some degree of respect with 
the British field commanders and be in a better 
position to protect – and advance – Canadian 
interests in South Africa.75 He was convinced 
that without a strong and capable commanding 
officer, the Canadian troops would risk “being 
either ignored altogether or left on the lines of 
communications,” limited to the protection of 
supply routes, and garrison duty, far removed 
from front-line combat where battle honours 
were earned.76 Hutton was likely not wrong in 
his assessment of what the Canadian contingent 
needed to be successful in South Africa, but 
blinded by his desire to command in war he was 
overlooking the emerging nationalist sentiment 
that was gripping the country, an important 
element that Minto recognized. The governor-
general had been unequivocal in his advice to the 
colonial secretary that a Canadian officer should 
command the Canadian soldiers, and Hutton was 
therefore ordered to remain in Canada as GOC 
to continue the reform of the militia.77 
 The rank of the Canadian officer commanding 
the contingent was significant to Hutton and 
Minto. The higher the rank of the Canadian officer 
in the field, the easier it would be for this officer to 
get access to senior British commanders to ensure 
Canadian interests were protected, and the less 
likely Canadian troops would be misemployed 
or broken down into small units and dispersed. 
British commanders preferred to attach small 
numbers of colonial troops to regular British 
units, and limit the rank of the senior colonial 
officer to curtail the independence of colonial 
continents, minimize colonial influence, and to 
guarantee a greater number of higher command 
positions for the British regulars.78
 In his earlier correspondence with the 
colonial secretary, the governor-general had 
frequently emphasized the need for a senior 
Canadian officer, always suggesting Otter as the 
best candidate, even if he were “to sink rank to 
Major.”79 While Canadian politicians and military 
officers accepted that, once deployed to South 
Africa, the senior Canadian officer would receive 
his orders from the commander-in-chief of the 
imperial force in South Africa, Minto and Hutton 
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fully appreciated the national significance of a 
Canadian commanding the unified contingent. 
Although they never expressed it in these terms in 
their correspondence, they clearly saw Otter as a 
national commander, and not solely as a tactical 
field officer.80 They knew that only an officer of 
Otter’s experience (he was 56 years old), wearing 
the appropriate rank, could earn some respect 
from the British chain of command. 
 Hutton was also experienced enough not to be 
deterred by the War Office condition stipulating 
that the highest rank to be held by any of the 
Canadian officers be that of major, and he 
continuously pressed for a lieutenant-colonel, 
and even a colonel.81 As well, Hutton never 
gave up his hope of a Canadian brigade. When, 
in December 1899, the Canadian government 
decided to despatch a second contingent, a 
regiment of two battalions of mounted infantry 
and three artillery batteries, he continued to 
urge that the two deployed contingents be joined 
to create one larger Canadian formation: “You 
as senior Canadian will have a fine command 
if you are ever brought together,”82 he wrote 
to Otter. In the end, no attempt was made to 
form the Canadian brigade with the two official 
contingents, and all the Canadian units operated 
independently of each other for the duration of 
their tours of duty. Minto and Hutton’s concerns 
in the fall of 1899 regarding the possible break 
up of the Canadian contingent into smaller 
elements for dispersion and integration within 
British units did not materialize, however, and 
the British senior commander in South Africa 
never seriously considered splitting the infantry 
regiment into smaller elements. Except for very 
short periods, and only because a force smaller 
than a battalion was often all that was necessary 
for a particular mission, 2 RCR stayed united 
for the duration of the war. Otter deployed to 
South Africa as a lieutenant-colonel (he was 
even promoted to colonel toward the end of his 
tour) commanding the first contingent. Once 
the precedent had been set, other Canadian 
commanding officers also served as lieutenant-
colonels. 
Conclusion: The Seeds of
National Command
With the sailing from Quebec City of 1,019 officers and soldiers on the SS Sardinian 
on 30 October 1899, Canada, for the first time in 
its history, sent a formed contingent commanded 
by a senior Canadian officer to participate in an 
overseas war. The 14 October order-in-council 
clearly stated that expenditures associated with 
the equipping and transporting of Canadian 
volunteers “cannot be…construed as a precedent 
for future action.”83 In spite of this stipulation, 
the rejection by Minto and Hutton of the War 
Office’s initial proposal of small Canadian units 
scattered through the British army in favour of a 
unified Canadian contingent was, as historian C.P. 
Stacey noted, “a small but nevertheless striking 
precedent.”84 
 Raising and sending official contingents 
meant that the government implicitly accepted 
additional responsibility for the expeditionary 
military force, certainly more than Laurier 
and the cabinet envisioned at the time, and the 
consequences of this new military policy would 
be important. For one, the formation of a single 
large regiment meant the creation of a regimental 
administrative structure and headquarters, and 
justified the addition of auxiliary staff (chaplains, 
medical officers, nurses, historical officer), all 
of which eventually enhanced the contingent’s 
prestige and provided for a degree of autonomy 
and self-sufficiency. The naming of the unit as the 
2nd (Special Service) Battalion, Royal Canadian 
Regiment of Infantry, was important to retain 
an association with a permanent Canadian 
militia regiment.85 Further, because this first 
contingent was despatched as an official Canadian 
contribution, which all Canadians clearly came 
to recognize as such, the decision allowed for 
the appointment of additional officers, including 
some that joined the imperial staff. Otter, the 
senior Canadian officer in South Africa, deployed 
with the authority and influence of a national 
commander, and even Field Marshal F.S. Roberts, 
the British corps commander in South Africa, 
treated him with deference, recognizing his 
national obligations.
 The initial contribution of a contingent was 
certainly worthy of Britain’s senior dominion. 
More remarkable in this episode were the 
efforts of three ardent British imperialists. 
They played an important role in convincing 
Laurier, the Canadian government, and the 
War Office of the merit of maintaining the 
unity of the national contribution. In London, 
Chamberlain, more interested with satisfying 
the wishes of the self-governing colonies in 
Lieutenant-Colonel Otter 
commanded the ﬁrst Canadian 
overseas contingent. Major-
General Marc Lessard, 
commanding Regional 
Command South in Afghanistan 
from February to October 2008 
is the most recent example of 
this tradition.
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order to promote his imperial vision, argued 
convincingly with the secretary of state for war 
for a large Canadian contribution to the war. In 
Ottawa, Minto, the proud governor-general and 
a former commanding officer, sought a dignified 
representation from the largest dominion, and 
kept insisting to Laurier and Chamberlain 
that the Canadians serve together under their 
own national commander. Lord Wolseley, the 
commander-in-chief in London, acknowledged 
Minto’s leading role in this episode: “I know how 
much we have to thank you for the Canadian 
Contingent. It is not because it adds to our 
strength so much as because it serves to draw the 
Dominion & the Mother Country together that I 
value the move. You have the satisfaction in this 
way of knowing how much you have achieved 
for England at this.”86 Minto had also achieved 
much for Canada, and there is no doubt that his 
personal engagement and resolve in the fall of 
1899 were quite influential in the outcome. John 
Buchan, Minto’s biographer, goes as far as giving 
him the credit for the contingent not “being split 
up among British regiments,” a fair assessment.87 
Finally, at the militia department, the aggressive 
and energetic Hutton, bent upon reforming 
the militia to create a Canadian national army, 
devised a bold plan for the creation of a large 
contingent that could be deployed overseas 
on short notice, and convinced Borden of its 
feasibility. 
 Hutton’s brief command of the Canadian militia 
was marred with disagreements, controversy and 
accusations, and he was eventually fired by the 
Canadian government in February 1900, after 
only 16 months in office. While he nevertheless 
had an important and lasting impact on the 
Canadian military, he remained branded as a co-
conspirator along with Chamberlain and Minto 
in forcing the hand of the Canadian government 
to send an expeditionary force overseas. Minto, 
Hutton, and more particularly Chamberlain, 
never received proper acknowledment for their 
actions, which in the end brought great credit to 
Canada and made all Canadians proud of their 
contingent. 
 As events showed, the Canadians soldiers, 
under command of a Canadian militia officer, 
performed very well in South Africa, and 
the creation of the first contingent of 1899 
established the pattern for the 1st Canadian 
Division of 1914. At the end of the 19th century 
three spirited British imperialists planted the 
seeds of Canada’s national command, and these 
grew over the two subsequent world wars. In 
2005, it would be an energetic and self-confident 
Canadian chief of the defence staff, General Rick 
Hillier, who would urge the Canadian government 
to contribute a larger and more capable Canadian 
Forces contingent to the campaign in Afghanistan. 
Canada thus gained several important national 
advantages, including the opportunity to have its 
own area of operations in Kandahar province, 
to have a more robust command structure 
including a senior national commander on the 
ground, to access higher-level command and staff 
positions within the coalition chain of command, 
and to have a stronger voice at the coalition 
decision-making bodies, such as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) council.88 
Canada’s current military contribution to the 
NATO International Security Assistance Force, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Otter 
commanded the ﬁrst Canadian 
overseas contingent. Major-
General Marc Lessard, 
commanding Regional 
Command South in Afghanistan 
from February to October 2008 
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Task Force Afghanistan, with a battlegroup of 
nearly 2,500 men and women commanded by 
a Canadian brigadier-general, and Canada’s 
command of over 12,000 coalition soldiers 
from 11 other nations (including British forces) 
in Regional Command South in Afghanistan,89 
represent the harvest of those fundamental ideas 
of the fall of 1899.
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